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“Agro‐terrorism? The Causes and Consequences of the Appearance of Witch’s Broom Disease 
in Cocoa Plantations of Southern Bahia, Brazil.” 
 
1. Introduction  
 During the last few decades, the media, government leaders, scholars and national 
security analysts have all called attention to the potential threat presented by terrorism as a 
means for political instability (Stack et al. 2010; Govindasamy et al. 2008; Santana and Rands 
2006; Cutter et al. 2003; Foxell JR 2001). Analysts typically present disturbing predictions of 
various threats and argue that terrorists will use weapons of mass destruction, particularly 
nuclear and biological, to cause widespread casualties (Cameron and Pate 2001; Carus 2002). 
Although biological agents have received significant attention, analyses have focused on the 
use of these agents to kill or injure people. Consequently, the intentional contamination of 
crops by biological agents has received less attention in the media and counter-terrorism 
efforts when compared to possible attacks on civilian populations (Monke 2004; Kohnen 
2000).  
 In many countries, agricultural systems are one of the main economic sectors 
contributing to political stability. Food prices in many countries are kept low due to 
efficiencies in production and disease controls. Thus, the concept of “agricultural terrorism” 
or agro-terrorism starts to assume vital importance since a disease outbreak in an agricultural 
system could cost billions of dollars, reduce food supplies, drive food prices up, stop exports 
of valuable commodities, and thus create political instability. In this context, agro-terrorism 
is considered an increasingly serious ecological and economic problem of the 21st century 
and potentially a driver of environmental change and economic hardship worldwide 
(Pimentel et a. 2000; McNeely et al. 2001; RAND 2010). Questions remain to definitions of 
agro-terrorism. However, in a simple definition, agro-terrorism can be defined as the 
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intentional introduction of a plant pathogen, virus or another biological agent to kill crops or 
animals (Stack et al. 2010; Monke 2004; Foxell JR 2003). However, despite the importance of 
agricultural systems to many countries, the causes and consequences of the intentional 
introduction of biological agents remain understudied.  
One of the challenges in agro-terrorism research -- and in bringing perpetrators to 
justice -- is to differentiate agro-terrorism from other explanations for disease outbreaks. 
Notable among alternative explanations is biocrime (or biocriminality). Biocrime also 
involves malevolent use of a pathogen or toxin to harm crops, livestock or people (Schutzer 
et al. 2005; Wheelis et al. 2002). Biocrime is thus similar to an assault crime, except that the 
weapon used is a pathogen or toxin. By contrast, agro-terrorism has a more specific 
definition; like biocrime, agro-terrorism also involves the use of biological agents to harm 
crops and livestock, but unlike biocrime, agro-terrorism also pursues a political agenda, as in 
other kinds of terrorist acts. Hence both biocrime and agro-terrorism are criminal acts via 
the use of biological agents, but the motives for biocrime are more varied, such as revenge 
or competitive advantage, and differ from those of agro-terrorism, which is eminently 
political. That said, it can be difficult to differentiate between the two if the perpetrators do 
not take responsibility and declare their political agenda. Thus, it is important to separate an 
agro-terrorist act with well-defined political agenda from other types of criminal acts with 
other motives (Wheelis 2000). 
This paper is one of the first to discuss a concrete case of the appearance of a plant 
pathogen in an economically important region, possibly motivated by agro-terrorism. We 
highlight both the causes and the consequences of the intentional introduction of pathogens 
as a means of causing economic damage. In particular, we develop three interrelated 
arguments: 1) agro-terrorism and bio-crime are both intentional criminal acts of introducing 
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pathogens into agricultural systems to cause economic damage, but only agro-terrorism does 
so to advance a political agenda; 2) agro-terrorism can be difficult to distinguish from bio-
crime, though there are tell-tale indicators that can point to one or the other, and 3) even if 
the intentional introduction of a pathogen is a political act of agro-terrorism, the 
consequences may or may not follow the desired script contemplated by the perpetrators, as 
pest outbreaks can entrain unintended economic, political and ecological consequences.  
To pursue these arguments, we take up the case of the fungus Crinipellis perniciosa 
(Stahel) Singer, or Witch’s Broom Disease, and its appearance in the cocoa agricultural 
system of Southern Bahia, Brazil. We consider possible alternative explanations for the 
outbreak, particularly agro-terrorism and biocriminality. We also highlight how cocoa 
growers, who constituted a bloc of landed elites who were harmed by the outbreak, 
responded to the attack by pursuing creative avenues of response as they fought to maintain 
their political and economic power. Finally, we evaluate the political opportunities presented 
by the outbreak to the leftist opponents of the cocoa elites.  
 This article is organized as follows.  First, we review the theoretical and 
methodological issues at play in the study of agro-terrorism and biocrime. Second, we 
describe the development of the cocoa economy in southern Bahia, Brazil. We focus on the 
formation of the cocoa economy via the creation of a landed elite, the “cocoa colonels”, and 
how this elite created a class of marginalized workers during boom-and-bust cycles. Third, 
we provide an account of the circumstances and spatial pattern of the appearance of Witch’s 
Broom Disease (WBD) in southern Bahia, noting aspects that suggest intentional 
introduction to maximize the impact of the pathogen’s outbreak, which nearly wiped out the 
region’s cocoa plantations. Fourth, we discuss possible explanations for the outbreak, 
focusing on agro-terrorism and biocrime, and considering evidence pointing to one 
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explanation over the other. Fifth, we turn to the consequences of the outbreak by outlining 
the response strategies of the landed elite, including new labor relations, land use 
diversification and farm abandonment. The discussion of responses also includes an account 
of how farm abandonment led to land invasions (or occupations) by Social Movement 
Organizations (SMOs) and negotiated land buyouts, which in turn are leading to the 
formation of land reform settlements. We conclude the paper with a discussion of the 
difficulties of documenting agro-terrorism and the implications of the case of southern Bahia 
for the broader study of agro-terrorism and biocrime. 
 
2. Agro-Terrorism and Biocrime: Causes and Consequences 
 
 The use of biological agents as weapons has been previously reviewed in the 
literature (Carus 2002), and many authors have addressed the threat of plant pathogens as 
weapons, and illustrated the hypothetical consequences of agro-terrorism attacks against 
crops (Stack et al. 2010; Fletcher 2008; Santana and Rands 2006; Hope 2004; Madden and 
Wheelis 2003; Wheelis et al. 2002; Meyerson and Reaser 2002; Casagrande 2002; Cameron 
and Jason 2001; Schaad et al. 1999; MacKenzie 1999; Rogers et al. 1999). These studies 
frequently argue that agriculture could be selected as a target because crops are cultivated 
over large areas and are poorly monitored; crops are thus vulnerable and there is relatively 
little chance to identify a perpetrator or the date that a biological pathogen was introduced in 
an area. Consequently, the disease from a biological agent may be present for months before 
it is identified (Ferguson et al. 2001). 
These circumstances thus make it hard to establish that pathogen outbreaks are in 
fact intentional and political acts (Fletcher 2008). Due to the vast area that an agricultural 
crop may occupy it may be difficult to verify whether release of a pathogen was intentional, 
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because there are other sources and vectors of biological agents, which may also be present 
(Carus 2001; Casagrande 2000; Chyba 1998). Pathogens may be spread by biophysical 
processes such as wind or water, spread unintentionally by humans, via trucks traveling 
between infected and pathogen-free regions for example, or introduced intentionally but for 
motives tied to biocriminality rather than terrorism. As a result, agro-terrorism is difficult to 
identify because a biological agent that is introduced deliberately may be indistinguishable 
from one that is spread inadvertently or introduced for other motives (Stack et al. 2010; 
Madden and Wheelis 2003; Kohnen 2000). If the introduction is not observed; if the 
outbreak occurs some time after introduction, and if no one steps forward to take 
responsibility, it is very difficult to establish political intentionality and thus agro-terrorism 
(Fletcher 2008; Clunan 2008). 
 These issues raise questions of how to establish intentionality and a specifically 
political motive. Some authors have posited several possible motives for an individual or a 
group to intentionally target crops or livestock. In the case of biocrime, the use of biological 
agents may be perpetrated among competing producers seeking advantage or taking revenge, 
or by vandals engaged in capricious destruction of property. By contrast, key among the 
reasons for agro-terrorism is the desire to alter supply or demand conditions for a 
commodity in order to cause serious economic hardship for political adversaries (Casagrande 
2000; Wheelis 2000; Horn and Breeze 1999). Motivations for agro-terrorist acts in turn 
contemplate a shift in the distribution of the burdens and benefits of agricultural production 
and political power as a result of the economic consequences of pathogen outbreaks. The 
presence of stark political inequalities has often been cited as one basis for disempowered 
groups to pursue terrorism in order to undermine the power of their opponents and thus 
achieve political gains (Abadie 2004). Similarly, violence becomes more likely to the extent 
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that control of agricultural production is highly concentrated in a few hands, marginalizing 
other groups. To the extent that such economic inequalities map on to the constituencies of 
opposing political parties, there is a basis for grievances that the subaltern party may be 
unable to address via legal means. And to the extent that power inequalities are extreme and 
institutional channels for addressing grievances are lacking, militancy may emerge, making 
agro-terrorism an “attractive” avenue for action.  
Beyond motives by themselves is the question of the process of how pathogen 
outbreaks occur. This varies depending on whether or not outbreaks are intentional. 
Biological agents dispersed by biophysical processes like prevailing winds or along waterways 
or habitat corridors exhibit predictable spatial contagion patterns as they spread across 
landscapes. Similarly, unintentional introductions by humans often unfold via spatial 
contagion processes, such as along transportation corridors. By contrast, the spatial 
distribution of intentional pathogen outbreaks often looks very different.  Agro-terrorism 
often targets politically important locations such as properties of highly capitalized firms 
(e.g., agribusiness) or political leaders. Hence intentional outbreaks are often concentrated in 
specific agricultural properties in a spatially discontinuous pattern. However, with time, even 
intentional outbreaks may then spread via biophysical or unintentional diffusion processes 
through the landscape. Regardless of the initial causes of an introduction of a pathogen, as 
the outbreak diffuses, it leads to broad mortality or morbidity of crops or livestock and thus 
financial losses and economic hardship. Outbreaks reduce production and income while 
raising the costs of containing and controlling the disease, thus reducing profitability 
(Madden and Wheelis 2003; Wheelis et al. 2002). In many cases, the destruction of the 
exposed host is often the only option, although it could bring environmental damage. The 
use of fungicides could be an alternative, but it would increase the costs of an outbreak since 
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fungicides are expensive, thus increasing production costs. Consequently, increasing 
production costs can reduce profitability and lead to unemployment of rural workers. Where 
controls may be expensive, they raise production costs; and insofar as controls may not 
prove effective, they reduce food production. In both cases, food shortages may result and 
food prices for consumers rise. Food shortages, rising food prices and unemployment can 
severely stress the most vulnerable groups of people. Consequently, feelings of deprivation, 
frustration, anger, and consequently increasing social inequalities may drive people to civil 
unrest and political instability.  
 
3. The Development of the Cocoa Economy  
 
 
 Here we pursue an analysis of the causes and consequences of the introduction of 
biological agents using the case of cocoa in southern Bahia, Brazil. We review the historical 
development of the cocoa economy in southern Bahia in order to highlight factors that 
shape this region, which made it vulnerable to pest outbreaks that could cause significant 
economic damage. In particular, we highlight the political economy of the cocoa sector by 
noting how the concentration of landholdings, conservative political interests tied to cocoa, 
the marginalization of workers, and economic boom-bust cycles led to a highly stratified 
society with attendant political militancy. We suggest that these conditions made southern 
Bahia a likely site of agro-terrorism. 
 Cocoa is a native species of the tropical forests of South America, and its production 
has a long history in Brazil. The southern part of Bahia state in Northeastern Brazil has for 
long been one of the richest cocoa-producing regions in the world. Frédéric Warneaux 
brought cocoa seeds to the region in 1746 (Tavares 2001), and the hot, humid weather of 
Bahia facilitated the adaptation and growth of cocoa in the region (Figure 1).  
8 
 
 
Figure 1: ABOUT HERE  
 
 Southern Bahia was a forested region that in the 18th century only produced a few 
pounds of cocoa. In the 1860s, industrialization in Europe and North America increased 
wages and stimulated a mass market for cocoa (Wright 1992). From an annual average of 
2,900 tons in the 1840s, Brazilian cocoa exports increased by 259 percent by the 1890s 
(Furtado 1963). This spectacular growth attracted people to southern Bahia from dry areas 
of northeastern Brazil to open up the Atlantic forest for cocoa plantations. Cocoa was 
planted in the shade of canopy trees in an agroforestry system known as cabruca (Rolim & 
Chiarello 2004).  At first, migration created a cocoa system that was centered on small-scale 
family agriculture. However, the growth of cocoa by the end of the 19th century made it an 
export monoculture, which encouraged formation of large plantations that involved 
concentration of landownership in relatively few hands.  
The development of the plantation economy in southern Bahia encouraged further 
migration and population growth, and the profits generated by cocoa production permitted 
regional development and integration of southern Bahia with the rest of the state. This 
expansion transformed cocoa into the main export commodity in the state, contributing 
more than 50% of Bahia’s exports and more than 60% of the state’s total revenue by the 
1970s (Willumsen and Dutt 1991). As the crop became important, the Brazilian government 
started programs to improve land management and technology (Johns 1999). At the same 
time, as the crop started to achieve success, many plantation owners became absentee 
landowners with little interest in diversifying production or improving land management on 
their estates (Alger and Caldas 1994). Instead, plantation owners took advantage of 
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agricultural programs and used subsidized credit and fiscal incentives to diversify their 
personal portfolios by going into other businesses, often located outside the cocoa region 
(Stevens and Brandão 1961). Consequently, many cocoa farms were managed by a gerente 
(manager), with the assistance of technicians trained at local agricultural schools, with little or 
no supervision from the landowner (Alger and Caldas 1992). Meanwhile, absentee landlords 
were in the cities concentrating on marketing, getting loans from the Bank of Brazil, and 
sending their sons and daughters to the best schools outside of the cocoa region. 
Nevertheless, cocoa as a monoculture was subject to boom-and-bust cycles. Crucially, 
whereas booms stimulated the expansion of cocoa and thus enriched landowners, busts led 
to unemployment of laborers. Over time, boom-bust cycles in the cocoa sector of southern 
Bahia reinforced inequalities between landowners and laborers and created a class of 
dissatisfied and marginalized workers.  
 Good international prices were always the best stimulus to increase cocoa 
production. Consequently, the cocoa economy expanded until the 1930s when a series of 
economic problems in Brazil, resulting from the 1929 crash in the New York stock market, 
raised the first “red flag” for cocoa in southern Bahia. Up to this period, the expansion and 
consolidation of the cocoa economy was possible due to favorable international prices, 
which transformed crop production in Bahia and created a class of powerful landlords (or 
colonels1) with considerable political influence. Consequently, decreases in market prices led 
the Brazilian federal government to act in favor of the powerful colonels, and this marked 
the beginning of a phase of strong governmental intervention with the creation of the Cocoa 
Institute of Bahia (Instituto do Cacau da Bahia-ICB) that had the sole objectives of alleviating 
the crisis and protecting landowners in debt.  
                                                 
1 Colonels were designations for powerful landowners in the northeast region of Brazil. 
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 Cyclical crises persisted until 1957, when the cocoa sector experienced one of the 
most difficult moments in its history. International prices dropped to the point where it was 
almost impossible for cocoa farmers to cover production costs. The mounting debts of 
cocoa farmers caused many landowners to abandon their properties. To contain this 
situation, the federal government created the CEPLAC (Comissão Executiva do Planejamento da 
Lavoura Cacaueira), an executive commission that had the objective to plan the financing of 
the recovery of the cocoa economy. To achieve its goals, in 1962, the executive commission 
created the Cocoa Research Center (CEPEC, Centro de Pesquisa do Cacau). As in many other 
parts of Brazil, the federal government pushed for agricultural modernization (Graziano da 
Silva 1981), and the executive commission saw the need to modernize cocoa cultivation 
(Garcez and Freitas 1975). The plan of the new research center therefore focused on two 
points: (a) the intensive use of agricultural inputs (fertilizers, pesticides), and (b) the use of 
new and more productive varieties of cocoa trees (Garcez and Freitas 1975).  
 The development of new technologies, rebounding international prices, and 
abundant subsidies favored the recovery of cocoa plantations and the colonels. As a result, 
southern Bahia became the world’s second largest cocoa producing region, after Côte 
d’Ivoire. For a short period of time, cocoa became the second most important export 
commodity in Brazil, with almost 20 percent of world production (Alger and Caldas 1994). 
However, this recovery had a cost. Where modernization and intensification occurred, there 
was also an increase in cultivated area. In fact, the area planted with cocoa increased from 
274,961 ha in 1950 to 380,387 in 1970 to 562,148 ha in 1985 (IBGE 2006). Consequently, 
the agrarian structure evolved to become yet more concentrated, making access to land for 
rural workers more and more difficult (Rezende 2006). Despite its merits in transforming 
southern Bahia into one of the most important cocoa regions in the world, CEPLAC 
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became dependent on the cocoa colonels that CEPLAC supported as they expanded their 
landholdings (Dias 1978). Specifically, CEPLAC depended of the political power of the 
colonels to pressure the government for increases in the agency’s budget. In turn, cocoa 
farmers became richer and more powerful to the point of influencing the selection of 
CEPLAC’s main staff, while rural workers continued to suffer from low wages. Thus, state 
support of plantations helped to reinforce a hierarchical social structure in which the 
colonels and businessmen controlled the land and thereby exerted political dominance, while 
on rural workers were relatively powerless and exploited via low wages (Valença 1999).  
 But as before, prosperity was followed by another bust. Cocoa prices dropped again 
as a consequence of cocoa production in Africa, and the price that was negotiated at 
U$4,000/ton in the late 1970s went down to U$800/ton by 1986 (Menezes 1993). As 
expected, cocoa production in Bahia decreased (Figure 2), and to complicate matters, Brazil’s 
economy was stagnating, with increasing inflation. As in previous production cycles, whereas 
cocoa booms benefitted the colonels, this cocoa bust hurt workers. The dominance by cocoa 
colonels, the lack of employment alternatives in a region dependent on a monoculture, and 
the lack of strong union movements all contributed to exploitation of rural workers. When 
cocoa entered another crisis period, the lack of employment alternatives forced rural workers 
to accept other jobs below the minimum wage and without social security in complete 
disregard for labor laws.  
 
Figure 2: ABOUT HERE.    
 
At the same time, Brazil in the 1980s underwent a process of democratization as the 
military government stepped aside and allowed civilian elections. This political opening 
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coincided with the re-emergence of leftist political parties and labor unions as well as many 
social movements (Toni 1999). In southern Bahia, popular dissatisfaction increased in the 
cocoa region, not just because of the economic crisis but also because of the widening 
inequalities between landowners and laborers, which prompted calls for public policies for 
social inclusion. As a result, various leftist parties such as the Worker’s Party (PT) and 
Democratic Labor Party (PDT) emerged, including militant elements vigorously opposed to 
the conservative politics of the cocoa colonels.  
In this context, as the colonels sought to manage the latest cocoa bust through 
intensified labor exploitation in their cocoa plantations, an unexpected event occurred. In 
May of 1989, the Witch’s Broom pathogen appeared in southern Bahia. Previously unknown 
in the region, its appearance posed an additional threat to cocoa production and thus 
brought strong suspicion that human agency was involved in an agro-terrorist act intended 
to undermine the political power of the cocoa colonels.  
 
3. Causes and Possible Motives for Witch’s Broom in Southern Bahia 
 Witch’s Broom, Crinipellis perniciosa (Stahel) Singer, is one of the most serious plant 
pathogens endemic to the Amazon region. It is a fungus well-adapted to the indigenous 
cocoa of the Amazon (Baker and Holiday 1957). This fungus attacks cocoa’s hormonal 
balance, producing hypertrophy and hyperplasia followed by tissue necrosis (Holliday 1980), 
leading to the death of the cocoa tree. The destructive potential of Witch’s Broom has long 
been known and studied in the Amazon, and for many years Bahia had a moratorium on the 
movement of cocoa in order to quarantine Witch’s Broom in the Amazon (Pereira et al. 
1996).  
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 The quarantine worked until May 22 of 1989, when in a regular field visit, an 
agricultural technician found the fungus in the Conjunto Santana farm in the municipality of 
Uruçuca in southern Bahia. This municipality was one of the most economically important 
and one of the oldest cocoa producing areas in the state, with 188,986 hectares and annual 
production of 114,134 tons (Silva and Leite 1988).2  
To contain the spread of the disease, CEPLAC decided to eradicate the fungus by 
burning the entire cocoa plantation at Conjunto Santana. The rationale was to minimize the 
damage to an important crop for Bahia and Brazil. Within three days of detection, heavy 
machines were used to prepare the plantation for burning. As a consequence, more than 200 
hectares of cocoa were destroyed (Pereira et al. 1996). While there was widespread criticism 
from farmers and the population in general, the CEPLAC experts in phytopathology were 
optimistic about the eradication approach.  
However, this confidence did not last long. A second outbreak was discovered on 
October 26, 1989. The second disease site was located over 100 km from the first site in 
another important and politically conservative cocoa producing county. This time, Camacan 
was the affected municipality with its 101,110 hectares of cocoa and an annual production 
around 50,869 tons as of 1985 (Silva and Leite 1988). In this second case, eradication was 
not considered a viable option anymore, and various alternative plans were discussed and 
tested by experts, such as chemical controls (Dorea et al. 1990; Setúbal et al. 1990).  
After these two outbreaks, Witch’s Broom spread from city to city along the BR-101 
highway, one of the most important roads in the region (Figure 3). The disease spread and 
new outbreaks were detected in the municipalities of São José da Vitória, Jussari, Santa 
                                                 
2 With other adjoining agro-systems, the area forms a continuous planting comprising 632,220 ha of cocoa 
(Pereira et al. 1996). 
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Luzia, Pau Brasil, and Mascote along the highway. In just a few years after the first outbreak, 
the fungus spread rapidly through the whole region, causing substantial damage to an 
economy already in crisis. In Uruçuca, where the first Witch's Broom outbreak occurred, by 
1990 the area planted with cocoa fell to 24,470 ha (a drop of 75% from 1985) and 
production fell to 15,171 tons (a drop of 70% from 1985). The appearance of Witch’s 
Broom in southern Bahia transformed Brazil from a cocoa exporter to a cocoa importer. 
 
Figure 3 ABOUT HERE.  
 
 The question of how Witch’s Broom came to southern Bahia became the focus of 
widespread speculation. Some argued that Brazil was a victim of agricultural sabotage from 
cocoa-producing competitor countries such as Côte d’Ivoire (Junior 2006). A second line of 
speculation argued that farmers with cocoa plantations in the Amazon brought the fungus 
spores unintentionally to southern Bahia (Pereira et al. 1996). Since many cocoa farmers had 
invested in other regions, this was a plausible possibility.  
However, 1989 was a presidential election year. Consequently, there were many 
strikes, protests, and demonstrations across Brazil against the right-wing candidate, 
Fernando Collor de Mello, and in favor of the leftist candidate, Luis Ignacio Lula da Silva.  
As a result, a third explanation appeared, which was that southern Bahia had suffered a 
domestic agro-terrorist attack. In this version, the Witch’s Broom fungus had been brought 
intentionally by left wing militants from the Amazon to undermine the influence of the 
cocoa colonels in southern Bahia (Junior 2006). Because the disease’s native area in the 
Amazon is separated from southern Bahia by almost 2,000 km, the appearance of the 
pathogen reinforced the idea that human agency was involved in the disease outbreak.  
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The third line of speculation received considerable attention. In four interviews in 
2006 to the popular Brazilian magazine, Veja, a technician and left-wing militant told 
reporters how he and five other left wing militants executed a plan called Cruzeiro do Sul  
(Southern Cross) to contaminate the cocoa plantations in southern Bahia (Junior 2006).  
Acting since the 1980s via protests and strikes in the region, the militant stated that the 
group intended to undermine the economic basis of the political power of the cocoa 
colonels who had influenced elections for decades in southern Bahia. In doing this, the 
group thought that left wing political parties would have a better chance in elections, and 
consequently, could promote land redistribution in the region.  
To achieve its goal, the militant stated that the group brought the Witch’s Broom 
fungus from the Amazonian state of Rondônia and selected the Conjunto Santana farm as 
their target area. The selection site to start the outbreak couldn’t have been more politically 
significant. This cocoa plantation was owned by the president of the local Democratic Rural 
Union (or UDR, União Democrática Ruralista), a right-wing union supporting the right-wing 
candidate in the 1989 presidential election (Junior 2006). The area of the second Witch’s 
Broom outbreak was similarly important in symbolic and political terms as another center of 
cocoa production and political control by the colonels. While a confession by a militant is 
not by itself proof that the Witch’s Broom outbreak in southern Bahia constituted agro-
terrorism, when taken alongside the spatially discontinuous pattern of the initial outbreak 
focused on farms of powerful colonels, one finds that both pieces of evidence point to 
intentional introduction of the pathogen for political purposes. However, even if one accepts 
the third line of explanation, it still begs questions as to whether this could be characterized 
as biocriminality instead of agro-terrorism. In addition, it also raises questions as to whether 
or not the political ends of the militants were served by the outbreak itself. 
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4. Consequences of Witch’s Broom: Strategies of the Landed Elite 
 The consequences of the Witch’s Broom outbreak in southern Bahia have been 
numerous and have transpired in a cascading fashion. Outcomes began with a decline in 
cocoa production, which prompted various new strategies by the colonels and opened new 
political opportunities for their leftist adversaries. But if it is indisputable that Witch’s Broom 
decreased cocoa production, it is arguable whether the outbreak undermined the power of 
the colonels or improved the situation of farm laborers in southern Bahia.  
 
4.1. New Labor Relations, Product Diversification, Farm Abandonment 
 For decades prior to the outbreak, CEPLAC and cocoa farmers in Bahia knew that 
Witch’s Broom was an extremely serious threat. However, the development of resistant 
plants and strategies to combat an outbreak were not top priorities in southern Bahia. 
Consequently, the appearance and spread of the disease, the non-existence of cocoa varieties 
tolerant to the pathogen, and the limited effectiveness of chemical controls (Purdy and 
Schmidt 1996) resulted in an abrupt decrease in cocoa production. The removal of Witch’s 
Broom and other infected parts of the cocoa tree continued to be the only management 
practice (Pereira et al. 1996). However, this type of practice is very labor-intensive and time-
consuming, since most farmers lacked large machinery, and since it requires the careful 
examination of each cocoa tree, thus increasing production costs. Low cocoa prices due to 
the economic crisis, paired with higher production costs, lower productivity, and the lack of 
preparedness of cocoa farmers brought serious economic losses to the economy of southern 
Bahia. Trying to solve the problem, the Brazilian government opened new credit lines 
through the Bank of Brazil, but the crisis transformed rich farmers into farmers with huge 
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debts and no money to pay for the costs of fighting the disease.  
After decades of booms and busts, cocoa farmers had grown accustomed to the 
cycles of the international market, but the appearance of Witch’s Broom was a different 
menace and required a different response. To survive the crisis, farmers pursued a variety of 
strategies to manage their farms. To offset rising labor costs, some cocoa farmers in the 
region started to use a labor system called “arista3”. In this system, the landowner allows a 
rural worker (and his family) to take care of a parcel of land, and this worker is responsible 
for all services in this area, such as weeding and harvesting. To compensate the owner, the 
rural worker gives a part of the production in payment for use rights. In other cases, farmers 
adopted the “parceiria” (partnership), a labor regime in which the rural worker (and his 
family) use the land and all tools that belong to the landowner, but compensate the 
landowner by giving him half of the production. Also, landowners made use of the “contrato” 
(contract), in which the rural worker assumes the responsibility for a piece of land for a 
period of time, usually three years, and all types of services in the farm.   
In other cases, farmers moved away from cocoa and diversified their production 
systems to feature other commodities. Farmers logged their forested lands and cut down and 
burned cabruca vegetation in order to develop other investments (Alger and Caldas 1993). 
Better coffee and cattle prices in the international market provided attractive alternatives. 
Thus, coffee and ranching started to replace cocoa plantations in key municipalities of 
southern Bahia, such as Camacan (Alger and Caldas 1992). The possibility of investing in 
coffee production in southern Bahia also attracted the attention of traditional coffee 
producers of the State of Espirito Santo. Land prices in Espírito Santo were ten times higher 
than those in southern Bahia; the cost of one hectare of land in Espírito Santo was R$30,000 
                                                 
3 The word arista comes from area. It relates to that area that a rural worker is responsible in a farm. 
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and in southern Bahia it was R$3,000 
(http://blogdomiolobaiano.blogspot.com/2009/11/cafe-comeca-substituir-o-cacau-
na.html).  As a consequence, since the appearance of Witch’s Broom, the area planted with 
coffee in southern Bahia increased 100 percent, and the number of heads of cattle increased 
almost 20 percent (IBGE 2006).  
However, even these incentives weren’t good enough for some farmers, who just 
abandoned their cocoa plantations due to the lack of financial resources and huge debts, in 
the expectation that the crisis would eventually pass. The crisis did not cease as before, and 
approximately 200,000 rural workers lost their jobs in the cocoa plantations by the mid-
1990s (Demeter 1996). The economic downturn in southern Bahia further deepened the 
social marginalization of rural workers, who had no choice but to move to the cities. 
Consequently, the urban population of southern Bahia grew rapidly from 542,298 in 1991 to 
636,670 by 2000, or 17% in nine years (Table 1). The situation of marginalized workers did 
not improve in the cities, because the cocoa region is not a manufacturing area that could 
absorb the labor force from the countryside. Despite persistent promises from the federal 
and state governments to find a solution to the cocoa crisis, trade and business in the major 
cities of the region suffered from a lack of sales, and there was substantial regional 
unemployment. As a result, masses of rural workers fell into social marginalization through 
low-wage work, unemployment, and sub-human living conditions (Simmons et al. 2007; 
Wolford 2005; Caldas et al. 2010).   
 
Table 1: ABOUT HERE 
 
4.2. Land Occupations and Buyouts for Land Reform Settlement Formation 
19 
 
 The lack of support from the government and the creation of a marginalized 
population without jobs increased popular dissatisfaction in southern Bahia. It is well known 
that social movements are a significant way that ordinary people participate in political action 
by making claims on elites or the state (Tilly 2004). The 1989 elections occurred in the larger 
context of democratization in Brazil, which also prompted the emergence of many social 
movements across the country, including in southern Bahia. Perhaps no social movement in 
Brazil has been more significant than that of rural landless workers who mobilized to 
demand better working conditions and land reform (Branford and Rocha 2002; Simmons et 
al. 2010; Caldas et al. 2010; Aldrich et al. 2012). Rural landless workers’ movements also 
mobilized in southern Bahia to contest the longstanding concentration of land and 
marginalization of workers there, by challenging the political power of the cocoa colonels.  
 While many social movements for land reform do not participate in electoral politics, 
it is well known that there is a significant intersection in the landless rural workers 
movement between leftist party officials and social movement organizations (SMOs) 
(Branford and Rocha 2002). This exchange of support was a key factor for landless rural 
worker SMOs to push a dual agenda by supporting left-wing political parties in elections, as 
well as direct action land occupations4 in southern Bahia. 
By undermining the economic power of the cocoa colonels, Witch’s Broom 
provided a political opportunity for their leftist adversaries. Before the cocoa crisis, SMOs in 
southern Bahia were almost non-existent due to the political hegemony of the cocoa 
colonels. In addition, right wing politicians dominated political representation in southern 
Bahia. However, in 1993, four years after the Witch’s Broom outbreak, one of the most 
important cities in southern Bahia, Itabuna, elected a congressman (Deputado Federal) from 
                                                 
4 By Brazilian laws, individuals that occupy and improve private lands not in production for five years and a day 
can obtain legal right to claim the land. See Brazilian Constitution, article 191 of 1988 for more details. 
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the Workers Party (PT). And in the following election of 1996 for members of the city hall 
and mayor, all three cities in the most affected municipalities, Uruçuca, Ilhéus and Camacan, 
elected left-wing mayors. While this number may seem small, because those municipalities 
had been strongholds of the cocoa colonels, the 1996 elections were an historic reversal in 
southern Bahia.  
In addition, land reform SMOs (e.g., The Land Struggle Movement [Movimento de 
Luta pela Terra, or MLT]; The Landless Workers Movement [Movimento dos Trabalhadores Sem-
Terra, or MST], among others) began to recruit rural workers in urban centers to participate 
in direct action tactics (Wolford 2005, 2004). Through SMOs, the marginalized population 
of cocoa workers realized their own agency by making demands for land reform. Tired of 
waiting for concrete action from the government, rural workers instead occupied cocoa 
farms that had been abandoned. Together, urban recruitment and rural land occupations 
constitute a process known as Direct Action Land Reform, or DALR (Simmons et al. 2007). 
The lack of jobs, poor land management, and the abandonment of cocoa farms became a 
unifying rallying cry for landless workers pursuing DALR occupations in southern Bahia.  
In northeastern Brazil, settlements formed by DALR occupations represent 45% of 
all such settlements in the country (INCRA 2011). This high percentage is a consequence of 
contentious land occupation in a region characterized by historical land concentration, but it 
is important to note two points that make southern Bahia somewhat different from the rest 
of Brazil.  First, violence was not a big problem like in the Amazon from the 1980s to the 
early 1990s (Schmink and Wood, 1992; Hall, 1987; Almeida 1995; Aldrich et al. 2012) since 
only a few murders over land occurred during the same period of time. Second, parties in 
agrarian conflict in southern Bahia pursued land buyouts as a means of resolving their 
differences.  
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This second point deserves further comment, because farmers were willing to be 
bought out for two main reasons. For one thing, the crisis had burdened farmers with debts, 
so they were not prepared to assume the costs required to combat Witch’s Broom. In 
addition, many landowners were living in the cities. This permitted close ties between 
colonels and staff of the Bank of Brazil (Alger 2003), an institution that provides direct loans 
and credit for agriculture. This connection facilitated foreclosures on loans wherein the Bank 
of Brazil took the property as well as its attendant debts (Região 1998). In this context, the 
Bank of Brazil viewed such transactions as attractive since land was a fungible asset unlikely 
to lose its value. 
Given their debts and contacts with the Bank of Brazil, some landowners adopted 
the unprecedented tactic of actually inviting landless groups to occupy abandoned cocoa 
plantations. Further, these property owners agreed not to contest occupations5 in court. The 
objective for landowners was to secure commitments from INCRA (the National Institute 
of Colonization and Agrarian Reform) for fast compensation at a fixed price negotiated with 
the Bank of Brazil. INCRA would act as the negotiator between the landowner, landless 
people and the Bank of Brazil. Due to low land prices in the region, this tactic seemed to be 
a win-win situation since the Bank of Brazil closed out debts on better terms than through 
farm repossession (Alger 2003). Indeed, the politics of occupations and buyouts prompted 
some landowners to try to sell their land to landless people for a price higher than the 
market price. INCRA is anxious to seek commitments of non-confrontation and non-
violence from occupants to avoid attracting negative attention from human rights 
organizations and result in criticism over evictions, so landowners would demand a higher 
                                                 
5 A crucial distinction between occupation and invasion exists. In the discourse of the landless militants, they 
occupy land that is not in fulfillment of a social function. However, for landowners, the landless movement is 
invading their properties (Caldas 2008; Simmons et al. 2010). 
 
22 
 
price for agreeing to negotiate buyouts (Alger and Caldas 1993; Caldas 2008; Simmons et al 
2010).  
As a result, the cocoa crisis in southern Bahia led to a proliferation of land reform 
settlements. Before the economic crisis, southern Bahia had only seven land reform 
settlements linked to four social movement organizations. The cocoa crisis of the 1980s 
stimulated 64 new encampments involving 4,538 families, and by the beginning of 1990s, 
settlements were linked to 37 different social movement organizations (INCRA 2011). 
Furthermore, since the appearance of Witch’s Broom around 1990, 35 additional settlements 
were created in an area of 25,043 hectares with almost 1,500 families (Table 2).  
 
Table 2: ABOUT HERE 
5. Discussion and conclusion 
 In contrast to earlier cocoa crises, the crisis of the 1980s led to an unprecedented 
situation for cocoa producers in southern Bahia. The combination of low commodity prices, 
Witch’s Broom, and rising labor costs meant that waiting for cocoa prices to rise would not 
be a sufficient response. The new conditions of the crisis therefore yielded several important 
consequences. First, the political power of the colonels was undermined, with the decline of 
their economic power. Second, the crisis created opportunities for social mobilization by 
political leftists who pursued both successful electoral campaigns and direct action tactics via 
land reform settlements. And third, landowners responded in new and creative ways, 
whether via new labor regimes, different economic activities, or acceptance of occupations 
and via buyouts.  
 While those dynamics are clear, it is less clear how best to characterize the processes 
behind the Witch’s Broom outbreak in southern Bahia the first place. The appearance of 
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Witches’ Broom in southern Bahia in 1989 has been described by Veja magazine as an agro-
terrorist act due to the fact that it was politically-motivated, with two important goals. The 
first goal was to disrupt the political power of the cocoa farmers, and second, to promote 
socio-economic changes through elections and land redistribution in southern Bahia 
(Trevizan 1996).  Assuming that the motives attributed by the magazine are correct, it seems 
that the first goal was achieved with the decline of the cocoa economy and the subsequent 
erosion of the political power of the right wing bourgeoisie. In other words, the appearance 
of the disease undermined the political power of the traditional oligarchic elite by decreasing 
its socio-economic status as evident in election losses and land occupations.  
However, the only claim of responsibility was based on a single interview. For some, 
such a confession could be considered evidence of an act of agro-terrorism (Casagrande 
2000). The spatial targeting of the initial outbreaks on the farms of politically influential 
colonels supports this interpretation. However, the confession stimulated debate and doubts 
as to its veracity, as well as whether or not the outbreak was politically-motivated agro-
terrorism or merely biocrime as revenge-taking 
(http://bahiadefato.blogspot.com/2006/07/cientistas-desmascaram-revista-veja-no.html; 
http://introtoglobalstudies.com/2012/03/witches-broom-the-mystery-of-chocolate-and-
bioterrorism-in-brazil/). Thus, while there are indications that Witches’ Broom was 
intentionally introduced into southern Bahia, the characterization of this as an agro-terrorist 
attack is not entirely ironclad.  
 The other issue that remains less than entirely clear concerns the reported second 
goal of the militants concerning land redistribution in southern Bahia. Even with land 
occupations and buyouts, available data cast doubt on the proposition that there has been a 
fundamental modification to the concentrated agrarian structure in southern Bahia. For 
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instance, rural properties with fewer than 10 hectares still correspond to only 1.9% of the 
total area for rural properties; at the other extreme, medium properties (80<300 ha in size) 
and large properties (over 300 hectares) still hold 64.8% to the total area of rural properties 
in southern Bahia (IBGE 2006). This does not mean that land expropriation is not 
occurring. In fact, 95% of settlement formation is occurring in large properties. Nonetheless, 
despite expropriations, large landholdings still hold most land in southern Bahia; for 
militants, this is still not a desired land distribution.                                                                                                
 One might argue that Witches’ Broom stimulated the onset of land occupations, 
which will continue to erode the longstanding agrarian structure. However, there are reasons 
to doubt that more time is all that is required for fundamental change to occur. For while 
some farmers have indeed abandoned their farms or cooperated in having their farms 
occupied and bought out, many others have instead engaged in new labor relations or 
pursued production of other commodities. This implies that the eventual adjustment in 
southern Bahia’s agrarian structure will be limited to those farms that are abandoned, and 
given the presence of alternatives for landowners, it remains to be seen whether or not 
occupations will ever come to comprise a large portion of land in the region.  
 Potentially lost amidst the debate over the Witch’s Broom outbreak and its political 
consequences are the equally important environmental ramifications. It is important to 
observe that both the economic crisis and Witch’s Broom could be bringing serious 
consequences to the Atlantic Forest, most of which has already been lost in Brazil (Chomitz 
et al. 2006; Saatchi et al. 2001). The cocoa region of southern Bahia is one of the richest 
centers of endemism in the Atlantic Rain Forest (Thomas et al. 1998) and an important 
biodiversity “hotspot” (Brown 1975; Fonseca 1985; Mittermeier et al. 1982; Myers et al. 
2000). While the expansion of cocoa in southern Bahia is by no means entirely benign, at 
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least it involved the cabruca agroforestry system that retained forest canopy. The economic 
alternatives to cocoa – logging, ranching, and intensive coffee – present more severe 
ecological threats. Thus, the decline of the cocoa economy is likely to threaten natural forest 
fragments, since the lack of alternatives could stimulate farmers to clear more forest (Alger 
2003; Saatchi, et al. 2001). 
 The case of Witch’s Broom in southern Bahia begs larger questions about the study 
of agro-terrorism. Southern Bahia is not different from what we see in much of the 
developing world, especially Latin America: there is unequal access to land, limited non-
agricultural employment opportunities, and other social issues that contribute to persistent 
poverty, resulting in a large marginalized population. Further, southern Bahia has 
experienced repeated commodity boom-bust cycles where booms concentrate economic 
power, which is parlayed into political dominance, and busts historically squeezed farm 
laborers, increasingly marginalizing them over time. The concentration of wealth and 
political power is a legacy of the colonialism in Brazil, and Latin America in general. Under 
such conditions, marginalized groups may pursue their objectives outside normal 
institutional channels such as social movements and political contention (Tilly 1978).  
It is therefore worth commenting on the relationship of social movements and the 
potential for agro-terrorism. Whereas social movements have arisen throughout Latin 
America to give voice to grievances stemming from social inequalities, it is far from clear 
that mobilization necessarily or usually involves violence along the lines of agro-terrorism. 
Although the concept of agro-terrorism emphasizes the use of biological agents to kill 
animals or crops (Tucker 1999, 2000), rural landless SMOs in Brazil have pursued land 
occupations and not used biological agents. This is not to say that violence has not occurred 
or that radicalism is not evident in agrarian reform movements. Some land invasions have 
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been accompanied by destruction of farms and intense political conflict involving violence 
between rural landless people and landowners (Folha de São Paulo 2012; Aldrich et al 2011; 
Simmons et al. 2010; Hidalgo and Richardson 2007). In addition, rural landless SMOs have 
articulated a movement strategy explicitly targeting agribusiness (Liberation 2012; Welsh 
2004). For instance, a manifesto called “Carta de Ribeirão Preto” from the powerful 
agribusiness association of São Paulo stated that the Movement of Landless People (MST) is 
creating an insecure and unstable environment through its criminal invasions and vandalism 
of private property (Folha de São Paulo 2012; Welch 2004). In the same year, the MST 
destroyed eucalyptus plantations of a Canadian-owned company in Brazil, attracting severe 
criticism from the landed elite (Welch 2004). While some accusations have greater 
supporting evidence than others, they do suggest that SMOs are pursuing contentious tactics 
other than agro-terrorism; vandalism is after all a form of biocrime. 
But insofar as such tactics are pursued as part of a political agenda, they approach 
the conceptual border between biocriminality and agro-terrorism. This in turn begs the 
question of where the tipping point between the two resides, and more fundamentally, what 
conditions push social movements to employ biological agents to kill crops and animals. It is 
useful to consider the conditions necessary for political tactics to change, as from land 
invasions to agro-terrorism. The case of southern Bahia is instructive in this regard. Beyond 
a concentrated agrarian structure and dominated polity, requirements may include 1) reliance 
on a well-established monoculture, 2) known vulnerability of the monoculture to a disease 
pathogen, due to a lack of cultivar varieties and/or to a large number of pathogens, 3) 
political militancy and organizations with the capacity to carry out agro-terrorist attacks, and 
4) a sympathetic population that stands to benefit from the upshot of such attacks as via 
alternative political leadership associated with agricultural systems that promise broader 
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economic opportunities for marginalized groups. Here the broader literature on terrorism is 
useful in highlighting elements such as these (Seebeck 2007; Carus 2002; Cameron and Jason 
2001; Foxwell JR., 2001; Wheelis et al. 2002; Wheelis 2000). 
 Finally, the case of Witch’s Broom in southern Bahia serves as a useful point of 
departure to consider the fallout from an agro-terrorist attack or biocriminality. Some of the 
ensuing history of southern Bahia followed the hopes of leftist political parties and their 
SMO allies, as via the reduced economic power of the colonels, but other aspects did not, as 
via the persistence of land concentration. Southern Bahia is especially instructive as a 
conservative region where cocoa farmers nonetheless adopted unprecedented measures such 
as new labor relations, new land uses and even accepting land buyouts in response to their 
rapidly changing economic and political circumstances. Hence in some sense the use of 
biological agents for criminal or political ends can be a game-changer in that it may modify 
long-standing responses to economic crises. That said, the outcomes of attacks with 
biological agents are not readily predictable nor necessarily to the benefit of the perpetrators 
or subaltern groups. More attention thus needs to go to the upshot of agro-terrorist attacks 
and biocrime as to whether or not those responsible and/or those who stand to benefit in 
fact are able to realize economic or political gains. 
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